7.1 High

In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with checkaccesspermission(), which builds the absolute path…

CVE-2026-116240

In server mode pgAdmin 4 validates a path into the user's storage directory with checkaccesspermission(), which builds the absolute path with getabspath(). Several callers then acted on a path they built differently, so the path checked and the path used could name different files: Opening a file in the Query Tool, the Google client secret and, on Windows, Import/Export Data, Backup, Restore and saving a file joined the path to the storage directory after stripping leading slashes and backslashes. On POSIX a path checked as a name inside storage could become an absolute path once stripped, so any file the pgAdmin account can read could be opened; on Windows a path naming a drive discarded the storage directory, so these could read, or write, outside it. Listing a folder decoded the path a second time after the check, so a folder named like an encoded "..", which a user can create, listed any directory on the host. Download, delete, rename and the file-exists check appended the path to the storage directory without a separator, so in a deployment where one user's storage directory name is a prefix of another's, another user's files could be read, deleted or moved; download also…

Assessment

CVSS: 7.1 (v4.0)
Severity: High
Known exploited: Not listed in CISA KEV
Exploit availability: Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
Published: 30 October 2026
Last updated: 30 October 2026
Affected: pgadmin.org
Assigner: PostgreSQL

CVSS vectorCVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

At the source

EUVD (ENISA)

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