In MCUboot's serial-recovery encrypted-image support (boot/bootserial/src/bootserialencryption.c), decryptimageinplace() and…
CVE-2026-127928
In MCUboot's serial-recovery encrypted-image support (boot/bootserial/src/bootserialencryption.c), decryptimageinplace() and bootimagevalidateencrypted() each keep a stack-local struct bootstatus. bootencload() writes the plaintext per-image AES key into its enckey[] field. Neither function cleared this structure before returning. In addition, a decrypt failure inside the per-sector loop of decryptimageinplace() returned early and skipped the totalout: cleanup, which left the expanded AES key context (encdata) on the stack as well. The error paths of bootimagevalidateencrypted() similarly skipped bootenczeroize(). The affected code is built when encrypted images (MCUBOOTENCIMAGES, Zephyr CONFIGBOOTENCRYPTIMAGE) are combined with serial recovery. It runs when an encrypted image is uploaded to the primary slot over the recovery protocol, and when the image list or state is queried while an encrypted image is in the secondary slot. After these functions return, the image's AES content key remains in dead stack memory. An attacker who can later read device RAM, for example through a debug port or retained RAM, can recover it. This weakens the confidentiality of image-encryption keys…
Assessment
- CVSS
- 2 (v3.1)
- Severity
- Low
- Known exploited
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Exploit availability
- Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
- Published
- 13 November 2026
- Last updated
- 13 November 2026
- Assigner
- zephyr
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:P/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
At the source
References
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