CVE Feed
8.8 High

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure.

CVE-2026-67543

Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (pythontoolexecutor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skillpythonexecutor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.

Assessment

CVSS
8.8 (v3.1)
Severity
High
Known exploited
Not listed in CISA KEV
Exploit availability
Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
Published
11 November 2026
Last updated
11 November 2026
Affected
heymrun · heym
Assigner
GitHub_M

CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

At the source

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