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6.1 Medium

Kiwi TCMS account confirmation open redirect through protocol-relative URLs

CVE-2026-77433

Summary In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated next parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses startswith("/") to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like //evil.com which start with / but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation. Vulnerable Code In tcms/kiwiauth/views.py, the Confirm view (line ~113): def getredirecturl(self, args, kwargs): self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index")) if not self.url.startswith("/"): self.url = reverse("core-views-index") The check startswith("/") passes for //evil.com because it begins with /, but browsers interpret //evil.com as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to https://evil.com (or http://evil.com depending on the current page's protocol). Proof of Concept GET /confirm/ /?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1 Host: kiwi.example.com Response: HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: //evil.com/phishing The browser follows the redirect to https://evil.com/phishing.…

Assessment

CVSS
6.1 (v3.1)
Severity
Medium
Known exploited
Not listed in CISA KEV
Exploit availability
Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
Published
9 November 2026
Last updated
9 November 2026
Affected
kiwitcms
Weakness
CWE-601

CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

At the source

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