termux-sync: Arbitrary file write during restore via attacker-controlled manifest source path
CVE-2026-86046
termux-sync restore trusts fields inside an untrusted backup manifest and uses them as the extraction destination without validation. During restore, each archive entry is handled as: srcdir = Path(info.get("source", ...)).parent extractarchive(archive, srcdir, ...) extractarchive opens the archive and runs tarfile.extract for every member with no path jail and no filter: with tarfile.open(archivepath, "r:") as tf: for member in tf.getmembers(): tf.extract(member, destpath, setattrs=True) There is no check that manifest "source" stays under an expected restore root, that tar members stay inside destpath, or that backupname used in temporary paths cannot contain ".." or separators. Impact: A victim who restores a malicious backup (local, shared, or from a compromised GitHub/Google Drive storage backend) can have arbitrary files written anywhere the Termux user can write. Overwriting shell startup files or executable scripts leads to local code execution on later use. Reproduction (benign markers only): 1. Build a backup directory with home.tar.gz (members: proof filename + optional config names) and manifest.json. 2. Set files.home.source to any path whose parent is the desired…
Assessment
- CVSS
- 7.1 (v3.1)
- Severity
- High
- Known exploited
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Exploit availability
- Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
- Published
- 16 November 2026
- Last updated
- 16 November 2026
- Affected
- termux-sync
- Weakness
- CWE-22
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
At the source
References
- https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/security/advisories/GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86046
- https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/commit/9c8637b280ee3e126885def5ff5b326c289ee7cf
- https://github.com/djunekz/termux-sync/releases/tag/v1.2.4
- https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-259w-wmqg-fp76
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