The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5tcpconnect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from…
CVE-2026-95822
The SOCKS5 client in subsys/net/lib/socks/socks.c built the CONNECT request in socks5tcpconnect() by choosing the SOCKS5 address type from the address family of the proxy (proxy->safamily) while reading the bytes out of the destination address supplied to connect(). A SOCKS5 request encodes the destination independently of the transport used to reach the proxy, so the two families are unrelated and nothing in the path forces them to agree: setcontextproxy() only requires the proxy family to match the socket, and zsockconnectctx() enters the SOCKS branch before any destination validation. With an IPv6 proxy and an AFINET destination the code treated an 8-byte struct netsockaddrin as a struct netsockaddrin6 and copied the 16-byte sin6addr from it, reading 12 bytes past the end of the object and transmitting them to the proxy. With CONFIGUSERSPACE enabled, zvrfyzsockconnect() copies only addrlen user bytes into a stack-resident struct netsockaddrstorage and enforces no per-family minimum length, so the oversized read stays within the storage but returns stale, uninitialised kernel-stack bytes. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore open an AFINET6 stream socket, point…
Assessment
- CVSS
- 3.3 (v3.1)
- Severity
- Low
- Known exploited
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Exploit availability
- Nothing found in Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or public PoC repositories
- Published
- 17 November 2026
- Last updated
- 17 November 2026
- Affected
- zephyrproject · Zephyr
- Assigner
- zephyr
CVSS vectorCVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N
At the source
References
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